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Abstract
Research aircraft have become increasingly dependent on
advanced electronic control systems to accomplish program
goals. These aircraft are integrating multiple disciplines to
improve performance and satisfy research objectives. This
integration is being accomplished through electronic con-
trol systems. Because of the number of systems involved
and the variety of engineering disciplines, systems design
methods and information management have become essen-
tial to program success. The primary objective of the system
design/information tool for aircraft flight control system is
to help transfer flight control system design knowledge to
the flight test community. By providing all of the design in-
formation and covering multiple disciplines in a structured,
graphical manner, flight control systems can more easily be
understood by the test engineers. This will provide the en-
gineers with the information needed to thoroughly ground
test the system and thereby reduce the likelihood of serious
design errors surfacing in flight. The secondary objective
is to apply structured design techniques to all of the design
domains. By using the techniques in the top level system
design down through the detailed hardware and software
designs, it is hoped that fewer design anomalies will re-
sult. This paper will first review the flight test experiences
of three highly complex, integrated aircraft programs: the
X-29 forward-swept wing, the advanced fighter technol-
ogy integration (Ab-'I'I) F-16, and the highly maneuverable
aircraft technology (HiMAT) program. Significant oper-
ating anomalies, and the design errors which cause them,
will be examined to help identify what functions a system
design/information tool should provide to assist designers
in avoiding errors.
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Background
System engineering has been recognized as an essen-
tial clement in the development of complex systems. The
top-down structured approaches to system engineering have
been slow to catch on because of a lack of computerized
tools.However,recentadvancesinpersonalcomputersand
newsoftware(S/W)toolshavereestablishedtheuseofthese
structuredsystemengineeringmethods._
The systemdesignaspectsof the systemdesign/
informationtoolexpandonthecurrentsystemsengineer-
ingmethodsby1)automaticallycreatingaknowledgebase
(KB)oftheprocesses,dataflows,andexternals;and2)in-
cludingfunctionsto verifyconsistencyin designrequire-
mentsuniquetoflightcrucialcontrolsystems.
Theinformationaspectsof thistooladdresstheneedto
providedesignandimplementationnformationthroughout
aflightcontrolsystem's(FCS's)lifecycle,and,specifically,
tothetestengineers.Theverificationandvalidation(Vand
V)effortforthedigitalFCSisofparticularconcerntothe
testengineer.CompleteV andV isrequiredtoassureflight
safetyandrequiresthedesigninformationtoestablish,run,
andanalyzetheV andV tests.Problemsa sociatedwithV
andV havecausedmajordigitalFCSdevelopmentsto lip
byasmuchas18months.2Thesystemdesign/information
toolneedsto include the flight control design knowledge and
its hardware (H/W) and S/W implementation.
Figure l shows a typical life cycle for an FCS and how the
system design/information tool would support all phases.
Shown is a typical life cycle for an FCS and how the life
cycle phases relate to the system/information tool's capabil-
ities. Some of the current tools which would share informa-
tion with the system design/information tool are shown in
the lower half of the figure.
The following review of research aircraft and the unique
design errors that were found shows how system complex-
ity can hide design errors from even the most experienced
engineers. These errors reflect, in part, the difficulty of ade-
quately communicating the system design details to the test
engineers in the multiple disciplines. These disciplines in-
clude flight control law development, H/W design and test;
S/W specification, coding and test; system integration and
test; and flight test operations.
X-29 Description and Airdata Single-Point Failure
The X-29A technology demonstrator aircraft is an experi-
mental vehicle which integrates a number of advanced tech-
nologies. These technologies include a forward-swept wing,
tailored composite wing structure, and full authority digi-
tal flight control. The aircraft is also highly unstable and is
dependent on the triplex digital FCS for stability and han-
dling qualities. 3
The FCS feedback gains are scheduled using air data.
Air data errors can cause incorrect flight control gains
and loss of the aircraft. To avoid incorrect gains, the
X-29A has three sources of air data. Redundancy man-
agement S/W takes the three air data values, detects any
failures, and selects a value to be used in the control
law calculations.
After flying over 200 flights, a serious design error in the
redundancy management logic was found during verifica-
tion of a new release of flight S/W being tested in ground-
based simulation. The error was attributed to the multidis-
ciplinary nature of the system and had been in the flight
S/W since the 38th flight. A lack of detailed understanding
about the interactions between the air data system, redun-
dancy management S/W, and the flight control laws allowed
for the design error to occur and is discussed below.
The fault detection level in the redundancy management
S/W was set at a large value because of errors, such as po-
sition errors, possible between the probes at certain flight
conditions (Fig. 2). In the case of a probe failure, air data
errors as large as the fault detection level were allowed to
pass through to the control laws. At the lower and slower
end of the flight envelope, a fail-to-zero of the nose probe
would not be detected. Simulations have shown that this
single-point failure would change the gains to the point that
the aircraft would become unstable and depart. For over
162 flights the aircraft was at risk of being lost because of
a single air data failure. The system requirement was that
the aircraft be operational after two air data failures. Un-
til a subsequent software release corrected the problem, the
aircraft was grounded.
AFTI F-16 Description and Flight 44 Anomaly
The advanced fighter technology integration F-16 pro-
gram investigated the integration of emerging technologies
into an advanced fighter aircraft. The AFTI's three major
technologies investigated were (1) flight-crucial digital con-
trol, (2) decoupled aircraft flight control, and (3) integration
of avionics flight control and pilots display. 2
The AFTI F-16 flight control system was a triplex, asyn-
chronous digital system. The asynchronous architecture
meant that input signals from sensors and controllers were
read at different times into the three computers using a high-
speed serial, digital data link (Fig. 3). Concerns for S/W
reliability were addressed with the inclusion of a triplex,
analog-independent backup unit.
The following summarizes an in-flight anomaly which
occurred on flight 44. 2 This anomaly was the result of the in-
teraction of many design characteristics and a unique flight
condition. The characteristics included asynchronous com-
puter operation, forward integrators in the control laws, and
output redundancy management S/W. These characteristics
coupled with a unique flight condition and resulted in the
divergence of the three computers' output commands to the
control surfaces. The redundancy management S/W in each
of the channels declared the other two channels as failed.
The pilots indication of this apparent simultaneous failure
of all three computers was a dual fail flight control light in
the cockpit. The end result of this in-flight anomaly was that
the aircraft safely landed on what was effectively a single-
string flight control system, even though no actual H/W fail-
ure had occurred.
Like the X-29 example, the AFTI F-16 had a serious de-
sign error resulting from the lack of a detailed understanding
of the interactions between the many different disciplinary
areas.Inthiscasethedesignerrorwasnotrecognizeduntil
afteranin-flightanomalywasexperienced.
HiMAT Design and Gear Deployment Anomaly
The HiMAT demonstrator was a remotely piloted re-
search vehicle which incorporated such advances as com-
posite structures, aeroelastic tailoring, reduced static stabil-
ity, and digital flight control. 4 The aircraft was remotely pi-
loted because the technologies represented too high a risk
for a manned vehicle.
The HiMAT was flown remotely with the pilot in a
ground-based cockpit and the control laws calculated in
ground-based computers. Surface commands were teleme-
tered to the aircraft as were aircraft sensor data which were
telemetered to the ground (Fig. 4). The onboard digital
flight control computers were dual redundant and processed
uplink and downlink data. In the case of a complete loss
of the dual uplink commands, the onboard system acted as
a backup FCS capable of orbiting the aircraft until control
was reestablished.
An anomaly occurred during the flight test program which
resulted in the aircraft landing with its landing skids re-
tracted. However, the pilot performed an excellent landing
and the aircraft was not seriously damaged. The anomaly
was induced by a single failure in the redundant uplink H/W.
The onboard redundancy management S/W identified the
failure and allowed for continued control of the aircraft, ex-
cept for the deployment of the landing skids.
The anomaly was caused by a timing change made in
the ground-based system and the onboard S/W for uplink-
ing the gear deployment command. This change coupled
with the onboard failure of one uplink receiver to cause the
anomaly. The timing change was thoroughly tested with the
onboard flight S/W for unfailed conditions. However, the
flight SAV operated differently when an uplink failure was
present. This critical information about the SAV was not
readily available to the flight test team.
Requirements for a System
Design/Information Took
These brief examples demonstrate that system complex-
ity is overwhelming the individual's ability to understand
the entire system and the interactions that can take place be-
tween the different functional areas. The X-29 example il-
lustrates how important the air data system and the redun-
dancy management S/W design information is to the flight
control designers and test engineers. Using the experience
gained from the above aeronautics projects, we have formu-
lated the requirements for a system design/information tool.
The requirements include:
1. A system design capability to ease the capture of de-
sign information. The system design capability will
provide a graphical, structured method for designing
complex systems. It will help the designer avoid er-
rors and allow the capture of the design information as
it is created. Later in the aircraft development this in-
formation, in the form of an intelligent documentation
system, will provide information to the test engineers.
.
Online documentation of all the information describ-
ing an FCS and the relationships between different
disciplinary information. This includes H/W, S/W, re-
dundancy management, and flight control law disci-
plines. The test engineer can then easily and graphi-
cally see the design information needed to qualify the
system, thus avoiding the in-flight consequences of de-
sign errors.
. Expert system functions to help analyze the relation-
ships between the disciplines and uncover where un-
wanted interactions can occur. These functions can be
used by designers, as well as test engineers, to assess
the system's operations and avoid serious design errors.
4. Ability to perform failure modes and effects analy-
sis (FMEA) on the many design iterations. Currently,
FMEA is only performed on the H/W, noton the system
as a whole. Because of the time required to perform
an FMEA, the FMEA is usually performed once and
is done with an early design iteration. The inability to
analyze the final design raises questions of the FMEA's
value. Automated FMEA using the current online de-
sign is one example of a capability that would assist
designers and test engineers in finding serious design
errors in a timely manner.
. Links from the system requirements to the S/W and
H/W designs. The links will allow the system require-
ments to be verified against the proposed implementa-
tion. Verification could then be done in an automated
fashion, prior to committing to the build phase. This
rapid prototyping concept would increase the chance
of finding serious design errors prior to flight test.
Currently, some system design tools have become com-
mercially available, but they do not address the needs
of flight-crucial systems and only create conventional
databases called data dictionaries. The actual H/W and
S/W implementation information is not an integral part of
these tools.
Description of the Knowledge-Based System
Design/Information Tool
The following section will review the work accomplished
to date and show how it applies to the larger problem out-
lined above. The methods for capturing system design
knowledge, examples of what can be done using this knowl-
edge, and an overview of the structure of the knowledge-
based system (KBS) will be discussed. In related work, a
good approach to design knowledge capture for the space
station can be found in Wechsler. 5
Focus
The effort is focused on the development of a generic
knowledge capture system (KCS) for digital FCSs, which
utilizes mature AI technology. The KCS is being used
to capture design knowledge for the NASA high-angle-of-
attack research vehicle (HARV), a modified F/A-18A with a
thrust-vectoring capability. The primary efforts to date have
been focused on the development of an intelligent documen-
tation system for the system and H/W design realms. Exam-
ples of expert analyses that can be accomplished once the
design knowledge is captured are described in the sections
on the spin recovery system and nosewheel steering behav-
ioral model.
The Knowledge Capture System
A major portion of the effort for the KCS has been de-
voted to the development of a knowledge representation
(KR) which is tailored to the specific needs of the FCS prob-
lem domain. Four domains of knowledge have been identi-
fied within the FCS problem domain: system design, H/W
design, S/W design, and utilities. These four domains pro-
vide the flight test engineer with the diverse kinds of infor-
mation needed and the relationships which exist between
them. Each domain possesses its own unique KR.
System Design Realm
The structured analysis methodology is used to describe
the system design. 6 This methodology is based on a top-
down hierarchical decomposition of system requirements
using an extremely graphical user interface. The decom-
position continues until the requirements are given with an
adequate degree of detail. This design methodology creates
a cleaner, more understandable design.
The tool creates linked hierarchical trees of data flows,
processes, and externals. Each node in the process tree rep-
resents a process and is provided with a process description
and other unique attributes which are stored in slots. To sup-
port flight control system design, the tool stores and tracks
requirements for failure probability and mission criticality.
In addition, external agencies and data flow objects are iden-
tiffed in the KB. All of this information is depicted graph-
ically in data flow diagrams (DFDs). Figure 5 depicts a
level 0 DFD.
The concepts of a process, an external, and a data flow, as
defined by structured analysis, are identified here as graph-
ical objects and individually represented as frames. The
properties of the process, external, data store, and data flow
objects are stored in the slots of the individual frames asso-
ciated with each of these objects. The name of the process,
failure probability, and data flow inputs are all examples of
slots. The nature of the slot values can draw from the full
spectrum of the paradigms supported by the Knowledge En-
gineering Environment (KEErU). Namely, they may be sim-
ple values, pointers to other frames, inherited values, active
values, rules, and so forth. This KR will allow the users to
perform various expert analyses of the system design. It is
intended that the pointers, which are stored as slot values,
will provide access to the related H/W, S/W, and utilities
implementation knowledge stored elsewhere.
A hierarchical representation scheme is used for each of
the three types of objects (processes, externals, and data
flows). Each of these three hierarchies forms an individ-
ual, linked KB. In each case, the hierarchy is used to allow
properties to be inherited and to identify the natural link-
age between individual objects. These individual KBs are
linked with pointers.
In a typical application of the structured analysis method-
ology, the data flow diagrams are viewed as an end object.
In this KBS, the data flow diagrams are primarily viewed
as a graphical front end for the KCS. Every data flow dia-
gram image is mouse sensitive and possesses its own menu
for entering and accessing knowledge. Now the test engi-
neer can graphically see the relationships between systems,
rather than trying to infer them from stacks of written text.
Hardware Design Realm
The knowledge representation for the H/W design is
based upon the hierarchical block diagrams typically used
in this problem domain. The nature of the representation
is similar, although not identical, to the structured analysis
methodology. The H/W objects are represented graphically
as blocks, and these objects are decomposed in a hierarchi-
cal fashion until they have been described to an adequate
degree of detail.
The connectivity between these H/W objects is indicated
graphically with lines. These lines may represent various
H/W connection abstractions such as data buses, a flow of
information, or a form of control. In any case, this connec-
tivity can be represented in the form of objects of a specific
type and may possess a hierarchical characteristic.
The concepts of HAV and their connectivity are identified
in the KBS as being objects and are individually represented
as frames. The properties of these objects are stored in the
slots of the individual frames. The nature of the slot values
and the hierarchical relationship of the frame representation
is the same as that provided for the system design. The H/W
block diagrams serve as a graphical front end for the H/W
design KB. Figure 6 depicts a top level H/W block diagram.
Software Design Realm
The structured analysis methodology is also used to de-
scribe the S/W design. The long-range plans include placing
the KCS on a network with a workstation that has the flight
code. This would give the KCS access to the flight code
so that it would be possible to pull up listings of the flight
code. relevant to the objects defined in the S/W design data
flow diagrams.
Utilities Design Realm
The utilities consist of the electrical power, hydraulic
power, and environmental control systems which form an
4
infrastructurefortheFCS,andanyembeddedavionicssys-
temfor thatmatter.TheKR for this realm will utilize
the structured analysis methodology to encode the design
knowledge. It will also utilize the block diagram repre-
sentation described previously for the H/W design realm.
This representation will be used to encode the implemen-
tation knowledge.
Authoring and Browsing Mechanisms
The authoring mechanisms allow the user to create,
delete, connect, and locate the user interface graphical im-
ages with mouse and menu commands. These ordinary ca-
pabilities provide typical graphical interface features. More
importantly, the authoring mechanisms allow the user to
properly create, delete, rename, and connect objects in the
semantic network. The objects and their linkage within the
semantic network are highly structured and canonical. A
failure to conform to this formal structure would destroy the
inheritance, browsing, and reasoning functionality. The au-
thoring mechanisms also serve to enforce the methodolo-
gies which have been deemed appropriate for the individual
realms within the KB.
The authoring mechanisms provide mouse and menu
commands for inserting slot values for the properties of
the objects in the KB. These mechanisms include an edi-
tor window for entering text descriptions and popup selec-
tion menus for properties whose slot values are restricted to
a specific set of legal values. In some cases, the entry of
slot values is monitored by demons. These demons actively
monitor the knowledge entry and warn the user if the new
value lies outside an envelope which is known to be valid. A
demon is used to verify that failure probability requirements
are kept as the design is decomposed.
The browsing mechanisms allow the user to display the
text description, hierarchical relationships, and properties
for the objects which have been entered into the semantic
network. This information is accessed through the graphi-
cal, menu-driven, and mouse-sensitive user interface. This
interface supports a random access to the KB. The knowl-
edge representation supports a browsing strategy similar to
the way we, as humans, pursue problem solutions. In this
case, the network structure tends to guide the user in ex-
ploring the KB.
A Decomposition of the Spin Recovery System
The HARV flight tests will include research flight work
with an angle of attack greater than 55° . For safety of flight
in this regime, a spin chute recovery system has been added
to the F/A-18A research aircraft. The following describes a
decomposition which has been performed on the spin chute
recovery system using the KCS.
Figures 7 and 8 show the hierarchical decomposition of
the primary system that will deploy a spin chute for a spin
recovery. These figures depict two of the many H/W dia-
grams involved in the decomposition of the spin chute re-
covery system. Figure 7 includes a partial display of the
hierarchy. Figure 8 indicates the use of dual abstractions.
The box/line graphics provide an abstraction which fol-
lows directly from the top level HAV diagram graphical user
interface. These box/line abstractions are linked directly to
the objects in the hierarchical H/W design KB. The bit map
graphical depiction of the circuit diagram has been added to
clarify the user interface at the component level.
The two abstractions are tied together with bit-mapped
hot spots. Authoring mechanisms allow the user to link the
box/line abstractions (and correspondingly their H/W and
signal flow objects) to as many hot spots on the bit map ab-
straction as may be desired. Browsing mechanisms allow
the user to mouse on a hot spot or a box/line abstraction.
Highlighting indicates the correspondence between a se-
lected hot spot and its box/line abstractions. Similarly, high-
lighting indicates the correspondence between a selected
H/W object (or signal flow object) and the relevant hot spots.
Further work in this area will be concentrating on the abil-
ity to take detailed H/W diagrams and perform failure modes
and effects analysis of the systems they represent.
A Behavioral Model for the Nosewheel Steering System
The KBS includes dynamic behavioral models to aid the
test engineer and also provides for rapid prototyping of the
system. These models will be used to describe the system
operation as a function of its operating modes. The models
will permit the user to interactively enter mode commands
and explore their impact on FCS operation.
The behavioral model described here permits the user
to issue cockpit mode commands to a nosewheel steering
(NWS) model which indicates the response and changes in
the aircraft state. The model is based upon a rule set and a
forward chaining paradigm. A dynamic display of the rules
and their execution is available to dynamically document the
system operation.
The NWS is a secondary control system within the FCS
which is only operable on the ground. It provides nose-
wheel angular deflection proportional to pedal force when
engaged. There are three modes of operation: off, low
gain, and high gain. The desired mode is selected by the
pilot, with switches located on the control stick grip, and is
a function of several inputs, such as wing fold and weight on
wheels. The NWS switch is used for NWS engagement and
mode control, while the autopilot switch is used for NWS
disengagement on the ground.
A dynamic interactive display (Fig. 9) is provided to
control and display the control stick switch commands, the
NWS system status, the NWS system block diagram, and
the relevant F/A-18A aircraft status. The display window
of the control stick switches includes a control stick and
KEE TM active images for the NWS and autopilot switches.
This window, which is mouse sensitive, will accept switch
commandsinanidenticalfashiontothoseissuedbythepilot
bywayof theactualaircraftcontrolstick.TheKEETM ac-
tive images, which depict the NWS switch and the autopilot
switch, are mouse sensitive. It is possible to issue a momen-
tarily depressed, held depressed, or released command with
these images.
The display of the aircraft status is also mouse sensitive.
It is possible to explore the NWS logical operation as a func-
tion of aircraft power, touchdown status, wing fold status,
and launch bar status by mousing the appropriate active im-
age. As these parameters are changed, the appropriate op-
erational mode is dynamically updated and displayed in the
F/A-18A operation mode window. The NWS-related air-
craft operational modes are: power off, wings folded, taxi,
takeoff (T/O), launch, in flight, and landing.
A rule-based system implements the NWS mode logic.
These rules are activated by the control stick switch com-
mands and by changes in the aircraft status variables. The
NWS system response is displayed by highlighting the ap-
propriate mode in the NWS control mode status window.
The NWS system response is also displayed by highlight-
ing the control path in the NWS system block diagram win-
dow. It is possible to trace the rule execution in a KEE TM
dynamic forward chaining execution window. The rule dis-
plays are mouse sensitive and permit the user to display a
selected rule.
Knowledge-Based System Structure
The KBS is coded in Common Lisp, utilizes an expert
system shell called the knowledge engineering environment,
and is currently under development on a Symbolics machine
(Fig. 10). This rapid prototyping environment has been uti-
lized for the development of a KCS, which is tailored to
the needs of the FCS problem domain. The KCS can be
ported to any platform which is supported by KEE TM. These
platforms currently include the Symbolics and other major
computing environments.
The KCS includes authoring mechanisms which enable
the user to build a semantic network uniquely appropriate to
a particular FCS. The KCS also includes browsing mecha-
nisms which provide access to the semantic network knowl-
edge. Rule-based models perform their reasoning on the ob-
jects defined in the semantic network.
The semantic network is composed of four realms of
knowledge: the FCS system design realm, the FCS H/W
design realm, the FCS S/W design realm, and the FCS util-
ities design realm (Fig. 11). Each of these realms is imple-
mented with linked hierarchical networks of objects. The
KBS semantic network is formed by linking the hierarchi-
cal networks of the four realms. The objects are individually
represented with a frame-based representation. Authoring
mechanisms enable the user to define a semantic network of
FCS objects and their properties.
The semantic network of FCS objects are defined in an
environment which includes an inference engine. Reason-
ing functions are under development which will enable the
user to view and analyze the objects defined. Three kinds of
models are to be developed:
1. behavioral models
2. failure mode and effects models
3. fault tree analysis models
The behavioral models are to provide a dynamic presenta-
tion of how designated objects behave as a function of user
commands, FCS state variables, and FCS modes. The fail-
ure mode models are to indicate the loss of functionality as-
sociated with component failures. The fault tree models are
to provide a diagnostic capability for the loss of FCS func-
tionality. This diagnostic capability will allow the user to
identify the possible causes and to help isolate the actual
cause of the loss of FCS functionality.
Concluding Remarks
This project has proven to be an ambitious one. The
roughly three man-years of effort have yielded a prototype
which promises to fulfill the objectives, stated earlier, for a
useful flight-crucial segment of the high-angle-of-attack re-
search vehicle flight control system.
So far, the promises of artificial intelligence have been
fulfilled. It has been possible to develop a knowledge cap-
ture system that captures the flight control system knowl-
edge in a form which is tailored to the problem domain and
is accessible to the user in a friendly fashion. Furthermore,
the modeling capability has proven the value of defining
the flight control system objects in an environment with an
inference engine.
The system and hardware design realms now have a
working functionality. In the remaining one man-year of
effort, it is projected that a working prototype, capturing
knowledge in all fot_of the realms, will be implemented.
in terms of computer resource requirements, the response
time is generally adequate, and less than 10 megabytes
on the hard disk have been required to date for the
design knowledge.
Looking to the future, it is projected that this prototype
provides an infrastructure upon which a full-scale, fully op-
erational knowledge capture system will be built that in-
cludes design aid capabilities. Longer range visions include
such growth possibilities as postflight fault diagnosis, real-
time ground support of flight tests, and real-time monitor-
ing in the cockpit. The complexity of today's advanced air-
craft demand that tools such as this be developed and uti-
lized throughout the life cycle to assure safe and efficient
flight operations.
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Fig. 1 Life cycle applications for the system design/information tool.
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Fig. 7 F/A-18A flight control system--spin chute deployment system hardware diagram (level 1 HWD).
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